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ABSTRACT
Living kidney transplantation offers the best treatment in terms of life-
expectancy and quality of life for those with end-stage renal disease. The
long-term risks of living donor nephrectomy, although real, are very small,
with evidence of good medium-term outcomes. Who should be entitled to
donate, and in which circumstances, is nevertheless a live question. We
explore the ethical dimensions of a request by an individual to donate both
of their kidneys during life: ‘dual living kidney donation’. Our ethical analysis
is tethered to a hypothetical case study in which a father asks to donate a
kidney to each of his twin boys. We explore the autonomy of the protago-
nists, alongside different dimensions of the public interest, such as the need
to protect not only the recipients, but also the donor and even the wider
community.
Whilst acknowledging objections to ‘dual-donation’, not least by refer-
ence to the harms that the donor might be expected to endure, we suggest
there is a prima facie case for permitting this, provided that both donor and
recipients are willing and that due attention is paid to such considerations
as the autonomy and welfare of all parties, as well as to the wider ramifi-
cations of acting on such a request. We argue for broader interpretations of
the concepts of autonomy and welfare, recognizing the importance of
relationships and the relevance of more than merely physical well-being.
Equipped with such a holistic assessment, we suggest there is a prima facie
case for allowing ‘dual living kidney donation’.
1. INTRODUCTION
Renal Replacement Therapy (RRT) is a term used to
describe treatments that at least partially substitute the
role of failed kidneys and includes haemodialysis, perito-
neal dialysis and renal transplantation. Transplantation
is associated with better survival and quality of life com-
pared with dialysis,1 and with better outcomes for living-
donor, compared with deceased-donor, transplants.2
Prospective live donors are assessed according to national
and international guidelines.3 The long-term risks of
living donor nephrectomy, although real, are very small,4
with evidence of good medium-term outcomes, at least in
1 A. Laupacis, P. Keown, N. Pus, H. Krueger, B. Ferguson, C. Wong &
N. Muirhead. A Study of the Quality of Life and Cost-Utility of Renal
Transplantation. Kidney Int. 1996; 50(1): 235–242.
2 Statistics and Clinical Audit: NHS Blood and Transplant Organ
Donation and Transplantation Activity Report 2013/14. Available
from: www.organdonation.nhs.uk/statistics/transplant_activity_report/
current_activity_reports/ukt/activity_report_2013_14.pdf. [cited 2015
January 25]
3 United Kingdom Guidelines for Living Donor Kidney Transplanta-
tion. Compiled by a Joint Working Party of the British Transplantation
Society and the Renal Association. 3rd ed. May 2011; www.bts.org.uk/
transplantation/standards-and-guidelines/; F. Delmonico & Council of
the Transplantation Society. A Report of the Amsterdam Forum On
the Care of the Live Kidney Donor. Transplantation. 2005; 79(Supple-
ment 2): S53–S66.
4 G. Mjøen, S. Hallan, A. AHartmann, A. Foss, K. Midtvedt & O.
Øyen. Long-Term Risks for Kidney Donors. Kidney Int. 2014 Jul; 86(1):
162–167; A.D. Muzaale, A.B. Massie, M.C. Wang, R.A. Montgomery,
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white populations. The quality of life of most living
donors is at least equal to the general population and
returns to pre-donation levels after donation.5
Who should be entitled to donate, and in which cir-
cumstances, is nevertheless a live question. In 1996,
David Patterson, an inmate at California State Prison,
USA, donated a kidney to his daughter, Renada Daniel-
Patterson, who suffered from End-Stage Renal Disease
(ESRD). In 1998, after this transplant failed, David
offered to donate his second – and therefore only remain-
ing – kidney.6 The case was considered by the University
of California, San Francisco’s clinical bioethics commit-
tee and David’s request to donate was not permitted.
Renada received a kidney from her uncle, but this failed
within a few years, and Renada died in 2007.7
A previous examination of the ethical dimensions of
this case 8 focussed on issues specific to David and
Renada’s circumstances, including the state funding of
healthcare for prisoners in a country with a private
medical insurance model, the rights of prisoners, and
the likelihood of rejection of a second kidney from the
same donor. In this article, we aim to build on that dis-
cussion, by considering a related but different scenario, in
which one individual asks to donate both of their kidneys
to two recipients. The case study we describe is hypotheti-
cal, although the clinical experience of one of the authors
suggests such requests do not exist in theory only. A
current case in Canada, in which twin girls each require a
liver transplant and the father can donate to only one,
demonstrates a situation where a similar desire might
exist.9 We anticipate that there will be objections to the
prospect of allowing such ‘dual-donation’, not least by
reference to the harms that the donor might be expected
to endure. However, we suggest that there is a prima facie
case for permitting the procedure, provided that certain
criteria are met.10 We begin by exploring the autonomy of
the donor and we suggest that such a request might well
be autonomous. Since autonomous requests are nonethe-
less bound in various ways, we consider the boundaries
that might be placed around such choices by reference to
the ‘public interest’. Here we consider not only the
welfare of the donor, but also that of the proposed recipi-
ents, and we argue that, on balance, the procedure might
even contribute to the well-being of all parties. We close
by reflecting on the potential wider ramifications of
allowing dual-donation, by reference to collective values,
including in the preservation of life. Here too we believe a
tentative case can be made, and ways can be found of
avoiding potentially slippery slopes. We tether our analy-
sis to a hypothetical case, which we outline in the next
section. Our case is located in England, but our argu-
ments will have wider relevance and resonance.
2. AN OFFER OF DUAL-DONATION
45-year-old identical twins, James and Philip, both have
ESRD secondary to X-linked Alport syndrome. They
have both been on three-times-a-week haemodialysis for
approximately five years, and have been active on the
national deceased-donor waiting list in the UK for this
time. Both have had recurrent problems whilst on dialy-
sis, and have received a number of blood transfusions.
The best option for James and Philip is to each have a
Living Kidney Transplant (LKT) from a friend or rela-
tive. They have inherited their condition from their
mother June, who is a carrier. In addition, June is from
Trinidad and has sickle cell trait, which means she is not
considered a suitable living kidney donor (LKD). Their
white British father, Tom, who is 69 years old, has been
retired for four years and is fit and well. No other friends
or relatives are available for donation.
Tom attends the renal unit to discuss his wish to donate
both his kidneys – one to each son. He reports that he has
been considering this ‘for years’ and knows that if he
donates both his kidneys he will require some form of
RRT. Having attended many of his sons’ clinic appoint-
ments and dialysis sessions he knows well what this
involves. He states that his main priority in life is to
ensure that his children are happy and healthy, and he
says that he values their well-being above his own.
M.A. McBride, J.L. Wainright & D.L. Segev. Risk of End-Stage Renal
Disease Following Live Kidney Donation. JAMA. 2014; 311(6): 579–
586.
5 C.R. Gross, E.E. Messersmith, B.A. Hong, S.G. Jowsey, C. Jacobs,
B.W. Gillespie, et al. Health-Related Quality of Life in Kidney Donors
From the Last Five Decades: Results From the RELIVE Study. Am J
Transplant. 2013; 13(11): 2924–2934.
6 D. Usborne. Convict Wants to Sacrifice his Only Kidney to Save his
Dying Daughter The Independent. 1998 Dec 8. Available at: http://
www.independent.co.uk/news/convict-wants-to-sacrifice-his-only-
kidney-to-save-his-dying-daughter-1190047.html [cited 2015 January
25]
7 M. Lagos. Woman whose Inmate Dad Donated Kidney to her Dies.
SFGate 2007 March 20. Available at: http://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/
article/BAY-AREA-Woman-whose-inmate-dad-donated-kidney-
2609092.php. [cited 2015 January 25]
8 R. Sauder & L. Parker. Autonomy’s Limits: Living Donation and
Health-Related Harm. Camb Q Healthc Ethics. 2001; 10(4): 399–407.
9 Eleftheriou-Smith l. Parents of Twins with Alagille Syndrome in
Public Plea for Liver Donor after Discovering Father is a Match – but
can only Donate to one Child. The Independent. 2015 January 26 Avail-
able at: http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/parents-
of-twins-with-alagille-syndrome-in-public-plea-for-liver-donor-after-
discovering-father-is-a-match–but-can-only-donate-to-one-child-
10003178.html [cited 2015 May 22]
10 A simple utilitarian approach might bring us to such a conclusion.
However, our analysis encompasses more than utilitarian concerns and
we suspect it draws a more restrictive line that a utilitarian analyst
might.
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3. AN AUTONOMOUS OFFER?
Whether or not Tom’s offer ought to be accepted might
be said to depend, at least in part, on whether his can be
considered an autonomous offer. Coggon has helpfully
provided a tripartite typology of autonomous decision-
making, by which we can distinguish autonomous choices
according to whether they convey an individual’s
current, best, or ideal desires.11 Reducing autonomous
choice to one’s current desires, and thus even to one’s
most fleeting whims, seems to deprive autonomy of the
reflective element we might expect of true self-rule. The
prioritization of only ideal desires then seems to go too
far in the opposite direction: here we would only count as
autonomous those choices which should be made, accord-
ing to some objective account of the good, and this
threatens to remove the self from self-rule. Perhaps, then,
best desire autonomy offers the best account, since it
allows the individual to choose, albeit in a suitably reflec-
tive fashion, in which there is due regard for what the
individual wants to want (their second order desires).12
Of course, whichever account is preferred, there will be
further criteria to be fulfilled before the individual can
be considered to be making an autonomous choice. The
usual criteria – which require the individual to have suf-
ficient mental capacity, information, and freedom to
decide – tend to align with our preferred account of
autonomy, in which an autonomous choice is one which
aligns with the individual’s best desires.
Applying these observations to Tom’s offer, he appears
to be suitably well-informed and we have no reason to
doubt that he has the requisite capacity to make this
offer. But is his choice truly his own, in the sense that he
has not been unduly influenced? Certainly, questions
might arise as to whether Tom appears to have been
pressurized (overtly or covertly). Rather than approach
this case with the presumption that such interference has
occurred, we suggest that we might better understand
Tom’s offer by putting it in (his) context – and doing so
should, in turn, better enable us to assess whether this
looks like an expression of Tom’s best desires.
As is well known, there is growing dissatisfaction with
the idea of autonomy as an isolated and individualistic
concept, which presumes that we exercise our self-rule
independently of others. More relational accounts
suggest that autonomy is both constrained and facilitated
by others. Anne Donchin has developed a critique of
the atomistic concept of autonomy, which ‘deprives
individuals of virtually all particularity, taking as the
norm a monadic self, stripped of all social relations’.13
Donchin has argued that autonomy should instead be
viewed as ‘a positive conception of human agency that
recognizes relational experiences as an integral dimension
of individuality’,14 acknowledging ‘the social context
that constructs and facilitates . . . choices’.15 Similarly,
Carl Elliott suggests that ‘a vocabulary of rights and
autonomy can be inadequate to represent the intimate
bonds of family and friends, the delicate balance between
sacrifice and self-interest, and the complex, often
awkward relationship between doctors and organ donors
or research subjects’.16
These insights suggest that Tom should not be isolated
from his paternal relationship with his sons; Tom might
remain an individual but his ‘individual identity cannot
be abstracted from its entwinement’17 with the identities
of these significant others. Once we appreciate this, we
might also come to appreciate that Tom’s choice does
indeed reflect his best desires. As such, we might conclude
that Tom has made an authentic, autonomous offer.
This, of course, will not be the end of the matter. Levy
has referred to an individual’s proclaimed ‘right and
capacity to make choices that advance their own signifi-
cant projects’.18 Here we move from considerations of
autonomy to considerations of liberty. As we have seen,
autonomy will conjure questions of capacity, but liberty
will introduce different questions, regarding the rights or
entitlements of individuals. No matter how autonomous
a choice might be, there remains the question of respect:
should the choice be respected, in the sense that the desire
is honoured? If autonomy is tethered to ideal desires, then
people’s choices will certainly be limited (indeed, they will
be limited from the outset). However, the extent to which
individual choices should be respected will be a live issue,
even if we adopt a more subjectively-oriented account of
autonomy, such as one that is premised on best desires.
We consider these limitations by reference to the public
interest.
4. IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST?
Coggon and Miola have suggested that, ‘Whatever the
overarching normativity, liberty is the freedom to act
11 J. Coggon. Varied and Principled Understandings of Autonomy in
English Law: Justifiable Inconsistency or Blinkered Moralism? Health
Care Anal. 2007; 15(3): 235–255.
12 H. Frankfurt. Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person. J
Philos. 1971; 68(1): 5–20; G. Dworkin. The Theory and Practice of
Autonomy. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge; 1988.
13 A. Donchin. Understanding Autonomy Relationally: Toward a
Reconfiguration of Bioethical Principles. J Med Philos. 2001; 26(4):
365–386.
14 Ibid: 367
15 Ibid: 374
16 C. Elliott. Doing Harm: Living Organ Donors, Clinical Research and
The Tenth Man. J Med Ethics. 1995; 21(2): 91–96.
17 A. Donchin. op. cit. note 12, pp 382
18 N. Levy. Forced to be Free? Increasing Patient Autonomy by Con-
straining it. J Med Ethics. 2014; 40(5): 293–300.
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within it. Liberty marks the bounds of the laws required
to mediate the co-existence of people who should be free
to act autonomously.’19 The boundaries that might be
erected around individual choices can be conceptualized
in terms of the ‘public interest’. However, determining
what is – or should be – considered in the public interest
is not straightforward.
Held has offered a useful typology for organizing
accounts of the public interest.20 First, there are prepon-
derance theories. These adopt a subjective account of
‘interests’, which are to be understood in terms of indi-
viduals’ preferences; on this account, the public interest
aggregates the preferences, in a utilitarian manner. Of
course, this approach leaves the public interest to turn on
what the majority of people happen to desire – and,
as such, the minority appear doomed to lose out. The
second approach is instead unitary, and locates the public
interest in those objective interests which people should
value. Yet this approach threatens to stray too far from
what people actually value; specifying these ‘objective’
interests is bound to be a fraught enterprise. The final
alternative strives for a degree of subjectivity, alongside a
measure of objectivity, in pointing to the common inter-
est, and therefore to those interests that might truly be
said to be shared by everyone. But here, too, difficult
questions will arise, about what these interests might be,
and about the respect to be granted to different, compet-
ing interests.
So what, then, are the values that the public interest
might be said to promote or protect? We can approach
this question by looking at the different sorts of claims
that are typically made in the name of the public interest.
Ashcroft has pointed to six such claims,21 which can be
organized according to whose particular interests are
being protected or promoted: the individual in question,
some other(s), or the wider collective.22 We will look at
each of these groups, starting with those other than the
individual, with a view to exploring whether Tom’s offer
to donate should be accepted.
5. PROTECTING THE RECIPIENT(S)?
Perhaps the most obvious arguments that could be made
for accepting Tom’s offer are those which will point to
the likely benefits to his sons, James and Philip. With
these transplants, James and Philip’s welfare should be
improved. Welfare, however, is another complex concept;
as with autonomy and the public interest itself, we can
consider three ways of understanding the idea.23 First, we
might see welfare in terms of desire-fulfilment, which will
invite reflection on an individual’s preferences and, there-
fore, on their autonomy. Alternatively, we might point to
particular mental states, such as pleasure and the avoid-
ance of suffering; bringing in notions like ‘quality of life’.
Finally, we can see welfare in terms of particular objective
goods: goods, such as life itself or the value in intimate
relationships, which might be judged valuable in and of
themselves, no matter whether individuals actually
happen to want these goods or how ‘happy’ they might
make them.
James and Philip’s desires – and thus their autonomy24
– can be accommodated if we insist that they must agree
to the offer and therefore to the transplant before it can
proceed. If accepted, the offer also appears likely to
improve the quality and length of their lives, especially
since their prospects of receiving a transplant from other
sources is slim. As of March 2014 5,881 patients were
registered as active on the deceased-donor kidney trans-
plant waiting list in the UK, and for the financial year
2013–2014, 2,142 deceased-donor kidney transplants
were performed in the UK.25 The short-fall between indi-
viduals requiring a renal transplant and kidneys available
for donation is clear.
If all three required a transplant, James and Philip
would be less likely than Tom to be offered suitable trans-
plants from the national deceased-donor list, and they
would be likely to wait longer for a suitable offer, for two
main reasons. First, an individual’s likelihood of receiv-
ing a transplant from the UK’s national allocation
scheme is reduced by any previous event that will have
caused their immune system to encounter ‘foreign’ mate-
rial and generate an immune response thereto. Through
this process an individual becomes ‘sensitized’, meaning
that a number of organs that may be offered to that
recipient are now unsuitable. Blood transfusions, preg-
nancies and previous transplants are all sensitizing
events. James and Philip’s previous transfusions are
therefore likely to have reduced the number of deceased-
donor organs suitable for them.
Secondly, James and Philip are mixed-race, and indi-
viduals from Black, Asian and Minority Ethnic (BAME)
groups are less likely in practice to receive a deceased-
donor transplant and are more likely to wait longer to19 J. Coggon & J. Miola. Autonomy, Liberty and Medical Decision-
Making. The Cambridge Law Journal. Nov 2011; 70(3): 523–547.
20 V. Held. The Public Interest and Individual Interests. Basic Books,
New York. 1970.
21 R. Ashcroft. From Public Interest to Political Justice. Camb Q
Healthc Ethics. 2004 Winter; 13(1): 20–27.
22 R. Huxtable. Autonomy, Best Interests and The Public Interest:
Treatment, Non-Treatment and the Values of Medical Law. Medical
Law Review. Jan 2014; 22(4): 459–493.
23 D. Parfit. Reasons and Persons. Oxford University Press, Oxford;
1984; D. DeGrazia. Value Theory and the Best Interests Standard.
Bioethics. 1995; 9(1): 50–61.
24 As understood in terms of their best desires.
25 Statistics and Clinical Audit: NHS Blood and Transplant op. cit. note
2.
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receive one.26 This is in part because of an increased risk
of ESRD in non-white populations in the UK, and in
part due to the ethnic composition of deceased-donors.
Matching of a donor to a recipient is likely to be closer
when the ethnicity of the donor and recipient are closer,
but there is a discrepancy between supply and demand for
BAME individuals: for 2013, more than 30% of people
listed for a kidney transplant were from a BAME back-
ground compared to just 5.6% of deceased kidney
donors. 27
Although scores exist, there is no simple way to deter-
mine precisely the likelihood of an individual receiving a
deceased-donor kidney transplant, but the evidence sug-
gests that James and Philip would be waiting longer. In
addition, recipient and transplant survival with LKTs
remains superior to that with deceased-donor trans-
plants,28 which may be an important consideration given
the ages of James, Philip and Tom. If Tom donated both
his kidneys and then (if he was willing)29 received a
deceased-donor kidney transplant, he might die with a
functioning transplant. For James and Philip, however,
the longer the ‘life expectancy’ of the grafted kidney, the
greater the time before a return to dialysis or a second
transplant.
There is, therefore, a case to be made for accepting
Tom’s offer, in view of the benefits to his sons’ physical
well-being, provided they are willing to accept the offer.
There is, however, the possibility that James and Philip
will be at risk of harm to their psychological well-being.
Qualitative research with potential and actual recipients
of LKTs, in situations in which the donor has donated
one kidney, suggests that recipients can experience con-
cerns about the donor’s health, feelings of guilt, and a
sense of indebtedness to their donor.30 One might antici-
pate James and Philip being especially concerned about
their father, and the impact on him of accepting his offer.
At the same time, however, the benefits to them remain
significant, so we cannot entirely discount the possibility
that they will be amenable to accepting their father’s gift.
It is arguable that the benefits to Tom’s sons outweigh the
risks that they will experience harm. As such, so far, we
have at least an arguable case that the offer can be
accepted.
6. PROTECTING THE DONOR?
Notwithstanding any benefits to others, there is some-
times said to be a public interest in protecting the indi-
vidual from him or herself, with the result that the liberty
of – and thus the choices that can be made by – that
individual will be constrained. Ashcroft exemplifies this
by reference to the compulsory detention of a mentally
disordered individual, when this is done in order to
protect his or her welfare.31 As with James and Philip, we
can refer to Tom’s desires, his mental state, and his objec-
tive good when thinking through his welfare.
There are evidently risks to Tom’s mental state and his
objective good, since donation will adversely affect his
(physical) quality of life, and perhaps his life-expectancy.
Feinberg distinguishes between ‘direct and certain harm’
and ‘the risk of harm’: the former includes ‘cases of the
direct production of harm to a person, when the harm is
the certain upshot of his or another’s action and its
desired end’, whilst the latter encompasses ‘cases of the
direct creation of a risk of harm to oneself in the course of
activities directed toward other ends’.32 Tom appears
most likely to be running the ‘risk of harm’; harm is not
directly intended but will ensue from him donating both
his kidneys.
In single kidney donation there is no physical benefit to
the donor but there is a definite, albeit small, ‘risk of
harm’ – including of death.33 Traditionally the harm asso-
ciated with donation is temporary (e.g. incisional pain),
but it may be more permanent and significant; as such,
the risk is likely only to be run if the probability of the
harm materializing is sufficiently low to justify the proce-
dure. In the case of dual-kidney donation, however, this
‘risk of harm’ becomes certain; the procedure would
inevitably result in some harm to Tom. Whether this risk
of harm should operate as a bar on Tom’s choice would
26 U. Udayaraj, R. Pruthib, A. Casulab & P. Roderick. UK Renal
Registry 16th Annual Report: Chapter 6 Demographics and Outcomes
of Patients from Different Ethnic Groups on Renal Replacement
Therapy in the UK. Nephron Clinical Practice. 2013; 125(1–4): 111–125.
27 NHS Blood and Transplant News Release 2014 Transplant and
donor disparity for BAME communities 13 March. Available at: http://
www.organdonation.nhs.uk/newsroom/news_releases/article.asp?
releaseId=359 [cited 2015 January 25]
28 United Kingdom Guidelines for Living Donor Kidney Transplanta-
tion. op. cit. note 3.
29 We will return to the possibility that Tom might not be willing.
30 I. Sajjad, L. Baines, M. Salifu & R. Jindal. The Dynamics of
Recipient-Donor Relationships in Living Kidney Transplantation. Am
J Kidney Dis. 2007; 50(5): 834–854; M. Calestani, C. Tonkin-Crine, R.
Pruthi, G. Leydon, R. Ravanan, J.A. Bradley et al. Patient Attitudes
Towards Kidney Transplant Listing: Qualitative Findings from the
ATTOM Study. Nephrol Dial Transplant. Nov 2014; 29(11): 2144–2150.
31 R. Ashcroft. op. cit. note 19 p21.
32 J. Feinberg. Chapter 20 Voluntariness and Assumptions of Risk in
The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law Volume 3: Harm to Self. Oxford
University Press; 1989.
33 Mjøen et al. op. cit. note 4; Muzaale et al. op. cit. note 4; A.J. Matas,
B.L. Kasiske, J.J. Snyder, M.D. Ellison, J.S. Gill & A.T. Kausz. Mor-
bidity and Mortality after Living Kidney Donation, 1999–2001: Survey
of United States Transplant Centers. Am J Transplant 2003; 3(7): 830–
834; H.N. Ibrahim, R. Foley, L. Tan, T. Rogers, R.F. Bailey, H. Guo
et al. Long-Term Consequences of Kidney Donation. N Engl J Med.
2009; 360(5): 459–469; D.L. Segev, A.D. Muzaale, B.S. Caffo, S.H.
Mehta, A.L. Singer, S.E. Taranto et al. Perioperative Mortality and
Long-Term Survival following Live Kidney Donation. JAMA. 2010;
303(10): 959–966.
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seem to rest on the doctrine of double effect.34 As such, we
would first need to rely upon a distinction between a
foreseen inevitable harmful consequence and an intended
harmful consequence. Defenders of the doctrine would
suggest that there is a valid such distinction.35 Secondly,
the doctrine also requires proportionality and even a
degree of necessity, in the sense that running the risk is
the best we can do. Here it could be argued that the risk
to Tom can be reduced, by ensuring that Tom receives
RRT and is placed on the transplant waiting-list.
Tom might even be able to argue that the harm-benefit
ratio can be further tipped in favour of honouring his
choice, since doing so respects his desires. Here we are
drawn back to our earlier reflections on Tom’s
autonomy. Each individual will have, in Rawls’ words,
their own ‘conception of the good’ – a sense of what is
valuable and to be pursued.36 Subjective well-being will
consist of both affective and cognitive components,
which includes desire-satisfaction.37 Desire-satisfaction, it
has been argued, involves a realization of desires, irre-
spective of any associated affective satisfaction. Allowing
Tom’s desires to be realized could be judged valuable
insofar as this involves respecting his autonomy.
However, Tom could also argue that it would benefit him
in other ways.
Tom could argue that his psychological well-being will
be enhanced, notwithstanding any risks to his physical
well-being. It seems plausible that Tom could claim that
his well-being is adversely affected by witnessing his sons
receiving haemodialysis. From an evolutionary perspec-
tive, Tom’s choice to donate could amount to biological
kin altruism:38 Tom’s desired outcome is the survival of
his genetic progeny, an end which he might judge out-
weighs any costs accrued.
Indeed, ensuring the survival of his sons could contrib-
ute positively to Tom’s well-being in a relational sense.
Here a parallel can be drawn with a ruling from English
law.39 Y was a severely disabled adult, whose sister
required a bone marrow transplant. Y was a suitable
donor. Although there was not a close relationship
between the sisters, Y reportedly took pleasure from her
relationship with her mother. The court recognized that if
Y’s sister died as a result of not receiving the transplant,
Y’s relationship with her mother would be adversely
affected, in terms of the duration of visits, as her mother
would have had to take on the care of Y’s sister’s child.
Strictly-speaking, the judge was required to decide only
on the basis of incapacitated Y’s ‘best interests’. Notably,
however, the judgment afforded room to the wider famil-
ial relationships and the donation was authorized.40
These arguments can also be made a negative sense; we
can point not only to the benefits that Tom might accrue,
but also to the harms he might avoid, if his choice is
honoured. DeGrazia argues that there exists a harm in
‘confinement’, in both a literal and non-literal sense i.e.
harm can result from the thwarting of desires and free-
doms.41 Indeed, recently a call has been made to the trans-
plant community to study the harms experienced by
potential LKDs who, although willing, are not able to
donate.42 In this work, Allen et al. argue that the risks of
donation and those of non-donation should be consid-
ered in tandem and, by extrapolation, the risk of non-
donation may sometimes be ‘greater’ than that of
donation. In Tom’s case, there might be a case for con-
sidering not only the benefits and harms of donation, but
also of denying him the opportunity to donate.
In sum, although there are risks to Tom if he is permit-
ted to donate, a prima facie case apparently can be made
for allowing him to do so, since this could also have a
positive impact on his well-being. Indeed, it seems argu-
able that there is a ‘coincidence of [the donor’s] interests
with the benefit to accrue to the recipient [s]’.43 This
cannot be the end of the matter, however, since we now
need to move beyond the recipients and the donor to the
wider community. Are there sufficient concerns at this
level to impose a bar on Tom’s choice?
7. PROTECTING THE COMMUNITY?
Ultimately the decision whether or not to accept Tom’s
offer requires consideration of the impact that this could
have on the community in which Tom resides.44 Identify-
ing and specifying the collective good is not straightfor-
ward but it seems plausible to suggest that a society like
England places great value on such goods as autonomy,
34 D. Sulmasy & E. Pellegrino. The Rule of Double Effect: Clearing up
the Double Talk. Arch Intern Med. 1999 Mar 22; 159(6): 545–550.
35 Ibid.
36 J. Rawls. A Theory of Justice. Harvard University Press; 1971.
37 D.W. Bruckner. Subjective Well-Being and Desire Satisfaction.
Philosophical Papers. 2010; 39(1).
38 W. Hamilton. The Genetical Evolution of Social Behaviour. I–II. J
Theor Biol. 1964; 7: 1–52; E. Madsen, R.J. Tunney, G. Fieldman, H.C.
Plotkin, R.I. Dunbar, J.M. Richardson, et al. Kinship and Altruism: a
Cross-Cultural Experimental Study. Br J Psychol. 2007; 98(Pt 2): 229–
259.
39 Re Y (Mental Incapacity: Bone Marrow Transplant) [1996] 2 FLR
787.
40 Feinberg op. cit. note 31; Given Y’s incapacity, we recognize the
terminological difficulty of labelling this ‘donation’, but will retain the
convention for present purposes.
41 D. DeGrazia. Chapter 4 The Harms of Suffering, Confinement, and
Death in Animal Rights: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford University
Press; 2002.
42 M. Allen, P. Abt & P. Reese. What are the Harms of Refusing to
Allow Living Kidney Donation? An Expanded View of Risks and Ben-
efits. Am J Transplant 2014; 14(3): 531–537.
43 Sauder & Parker, op. cit. note 8, p.406
44 We leave to one side how one determines the boundaries of such a
community. We restrict ourselves, here, to the jurisdiction in which
Tom resides, taken to be England.
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health, and life.45 Various laws and policies attest to the
assumed value of these goods; indeed, there are also
instrumental safeguards, such as the creation of specific
professions which work to secure these goods: healthcare
is an obvious example.
If, then, we assume that the society in question is dedi-
cated to promoting and protecting such values as
autonomy, health, and life, then how might these values
be served – or threatened – by Tom’s offer? In seeking to
answer this question, we will explore three specific issues:
the impact of donation on the collective goods; the
impact of donation on those who work to protect the
collective goods; and the impact of donation on the dis-
tribution of the collective goods. We will consider these
issues in reverse order.
7.1. Distributing collective goods?
Although more can be said,46 let us assume that health is
a collective good, and that the ‘healthcare enterprise’
exists precisely in order to serve this value, whatever this
‘fuzzy’ value might be said to encompass.47 Inevitably,
more difficult questions will then arise, about how the
enterprise – and the ‘good’ – should be shared out
amongst those individuals who make up the collective.
How might Tom’s offer relate to the question of
distribution?
If we stick with the UK context, a broadly utilitarian
approach might be taken to distribution: here, the
QALY (quality-adjusted life year) is used to ensure that
healthcare is distributed to those most likely to benefit, in
the sense that this will afford them good quality years of
life.48 This approach is, of course, subject to ethical com-
plexity and controversy,49 including in the field of trans-
plantation.50 If we nevertheless apply this logic, then
Tom’s offer could be considered favourably. Transplan-
tation offers a net cost-benefit when compared to dialysis
in a cost evaluation of RRT. The cost benefit of kidney
transplantation compared to dialysis over a period of ten
years is £241,000.51 The cost-benefit of dual-kidney dona-
tion in this instance is less than that associated with Tom
donating a single kidney to one of his sons and remaining
treatment-free. Yet, the most cost-effective solution
would involve Tom also receiving a donated kidney.
Whether a kidney would be forthcoming remains to be
seen, but, in terms of distribution at least, it seems argu-
able that Tom’s offer could be accepted.
7.2. Protecting the gatekeepers?
Remaining with health as a collective good, we should
also consider whether Tom’s offer might be considered an
affront to those who strive to serve this good, i.e.
healthcare professionals. Here we focus specifically on
the surgeons who would be required to perform the
donor nephrectomies.
Some maintain that medicine – and, by extension,
surgery – has its own distinctive integrity and perhaps
even a constitutive ‘internal morality’.52 On such
accounts, surgeons should only be doing that which is
compatible with the essential nature of their endeavour:
they are not merely the ‘puppet technicians’ of the
patient’s will. We might well anticipate objections to
Tom’s offer from this perspective. Tom’s request seems
some distance from the traditional ‘disease/treatment’,
‘doctor/patient’ models with which surgery might usually
be associated. Notwithstanding any psychological or
other benefits that Tom might accrue, Tom is not (yet) a
patient, nor is he an obvious beneficiary of the proposed
procedure, at least in terms of his physical health.53
Yet such objections need not succeed: those accounts
of the ‘core’ of the surgical endeavour that have been
offered appear to be neither necessary nor sufficient, and
they appear also to beg crucial questions.54 In short, there
is no obvious ‘core’ to the endeavour, and this should not
be surprising given the intrinsic fuzziness of the ideal of
45 Huxtable op. cit. note 21.
46 J. Coggon. What Makes Health Public? A Critical Evaluation of
Moral, Legal, and Political Claims in Public Health. Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, Cambridge; 2012
47 K. Boyd. Disease, Illness, Sickness, Health, Healing and Wholeness:
Exploring some Elusive Concepts. Med Humanities. 2000; 26(1): 9–17.
48 Measuring Effectiveness and Cost Effectiveness: the QALY.
National Institute for Health and Care Excellence 2010 Available
at: https://www.nice.org.uk/proxy/?sourceurl=http://www.nice.org.uk/
newsroom/features/measuringeffectivenessandcosteffectivenesstheqaly
.jsp [cited 2015 May 22]
49 G. Garbutt & P. Davies. Should the Practice of Medicine be a
Deontological or Utilitarian Enterprise? J Med Ethics. 2011; 37(5):
267–270; T. Ottersen. Lifetime QALY Prioritarianism in Priority
Setting. J Med Ethics. 2013; 39(3): 175–180.
50 G. Persad, A. Wertheimer & E. Emanuel. Principles for Allocation of
Scarce Medical Interventions. Lancet. 2009; 373(9661): 423–431;
J. Briceño, C. Ruben & M. de la Mata. Donor-Recipient Matching:
Myths and Realities. Journal of Hepatology. 2013; 58: 811–820.
51 Cost-Effectiveness of Transplantation Factsheet 7. NHS Blood and
Transplant Oct 2009; Available at: www.organdonation.nhs.uk/
newsroom/fact_sheets/Organ_Donation_Registry_Fact_Sheet_7
_21337.pdf [cited 2015 January 25]
52 E. Pellegrino. The Internal Morality of Clinical Medicine: a Para-
digm for the Ethics of the Helping and Healing Professions. J Med
Philos. 2001 Dec; 26(6): 559–579; F. Miller & H. Brody. Professional
Integrity and Physician-Assisted Death. Hastings Center Report. 1995;
25(3): 8–17.
53 As such, surgeons – maybe the profession as a whole – might dispute
the aforementioned suggestion that the doctrine on double effect might
apply i.e. they might object that a surgeon is being required to get
(morally) ‘dirty hands’, since he or she will be a means to the donor
coming to potentially significant harm.
54 R. Huxtable. Death on Demand: Proper Medical Treatment? In S.
Fovargue & A. Mullock, editors. The Power of ‘Proper Medical Treat-
ment’: What Role for the Medical Exception? Routledge. Forthcoming.
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‘health’ that medicine purports to serve.55 However, this
need not mean that we should entirely discount the views
of surgeons. As Freedman suggests:
the internal morality of medicine . . . rests ultimately
on society’s commitment to preserving and ensuring
continuation to a value through allocating it to be
especially safeguarded by concerned professionals in
society. By adopting a profession with its central value,
society has given warrant to corollaries of that value to
be pursued irrespective (sometimes) of, for example,
simple considerations of utility.
On this view, space should be afforded to the opinions of
these ‘gatekeepers’ to health, but the amount of space
afforded will ultimately be determined by the society, in
light of the various values it chooses to promote.
As such, society will determine the extent to which
surgeons’ qualms (if present) should be heeded. Various
laws and policies indicate that society wishes to afford
considerable space to such professionals. Surgeons are
therefore empowered as gatekeepers: they must, for
example, check that patients are competent, informed
and free to decide, but they are not obliged to act merely
on the basis of patients’ demands and they can, if con-
science dictates, step back from performing certain pro-
cedures.56 Yet, despite all this, the surgeon’s power is not
unfettered. Donchin reminds us that the ‘construction of
the traditional physician as a noble, paternalistic, and
authoritative agent ministering to compliant patients’ 57
no longer holds true; indeed, says Huxtable, ‘health pro-
fessionals’ conscientious desires are, ultimately, subordi-
nate to providing the patient with what they lawfully
want or need’.58
The surgeon therefore operates within boundaries
which, ultimately, are imposed by the society-at-large.
Surgeons and their professional bodies will influence soci-
ety’s judgment, but theirs will not be the only voices, nor
will the value they serve – ‘health’ – be the only value.
One way in which society expresses all this is through the
law: if a procedure is deemed lawful (subject to the satis-
faction of certain criteria), then the surgeon is obliged to
provide that service or, if her personal conscience is at
odds with this, another surgeon must do so. But would –
or should – society be willing to accede to Tom’s request?
We will not here consider the precise legal intricacies of
Tom’s offer, but we will reflect on the wider values dimen-
sions thereof, with a view to ascertaining whether this
might be an offer too far.
7.3. Protecting the collective goods?
In addition to the value placed on health, (UK) society
appears also to value autonomy and life, and will be
mindful of the wider impact that allowing dual-donation
might have on these values.
If we start with autonomy, it might be argued that
creating the option of dual-donation would compromise
the voluntariness component of autonomy. Here, we
might anticipate slippery slope objections, specifically of
an empirical form:59 allowing Tom to donate looks likely
in practice to have questionable consequences, one of
which might be that the value of respect for autonomy is
undermined.
One of the objections that is made against allowing the
creation of a market in organs is that affording the option
of sale will place pressure on some individuals to exercise
the option.60 By analogy, an individual could feel pres-
surized by the knowledge that dual-donation is an option
that others have chosen to pursue. Those who opt not to
donate might then experience guilt, particularly if they
are proximate to the potential recipient and they witness
that individual’s poor health; indeed, the unexercized
option might foster conflict between potential donor and
potential recipient. At the same time, we might have ques-
tions about those who do opt to donate: was their deci-
sion made freely, in the absence of undue influence?
If we assume that a slippery slope objection is valid,
then these concerns should give us cause to pause. Yet,
these problems are not new, since they already exist in
relation to single kidney donation: here too non-donors
might experience guilt and donors might feel unable to
decline to donate.61 Indeed, perhaps these problems will
be less acute in the dual-donation scenario. The signifi-
cant harms that the donor might experience – and thus
the gravity of their decision – could well incline those who
are denied the donation towards understanding, rather
than upset. Equally, the gravity of such decisions might
indicate that they will not be taken lightly, but after
careful reflection – and might therefore be less likely to be
coerced?
We can only speculate, but, so far, we appear to have a
prima facie case for allowing Tom’s offer to be pursued.
Yet, once we introduce the final value – of life itself – the
negative case appears to gather force. It might seem odd
to introduce this value here: Tom’s quality of life could
suffer if he makes the dual-donation, and there is also
some degree of risk to his life, but we have argued that
55 Boyd op. cit. note 46.
56 R. Huxtable. Whatever You Want? Beyond the Patient in Medical
Law. Health Care Anal. 2008; 16(3): 288–301.
57 Donchin op. cit. note 12 p369
58 Huxtable op. cit. note 21 p482; Personal Beliefs and Medical Practice.
General Medical Council. 2013; Available at: www.gmc-uk.org/
guidance [cited 2015 January 25]
59 D. Lamb. Down the Slippery Slope: Arguing in Applied Ethics. Kent:
Crook Helm Ltd; 1988.
60 S. Rippon. Imposing Options on People in Poverty: the Harm of a
Live Donor Organ Market. J Med Ethics. 2014; 40(3): 145–150.
61 H. Maple, J Chilcot & N. Mamode. Entrapment in Living Kidney
Donors. British Transplantation Society Congress 2014 Abstract
Book Available at: http://www.bts.org.uk/Documents/Congress2014/
BTS2014_AbstractBook.pdf [cited 2015 May 22]
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these risks might be acceptable. However, thus far we
have presumed that Tom would accept RRT: what if
Tom wishes to donate but declines subsequent treatment?
Such a situation would, of course, affect much of our
preceding analysis: now the health risks to Tom are more
substantial, and his sons more likely to experience guilt.
However, the other points remain: Tom might still insist
that this is truly his autonomous wish, in view of the
undoubted benefits to his sons, from which he will also
benefit in some sense. Ordinarily, the ethic of respect for
autonomy would require us not to override an autono-
mous refusal of treatment. What if Tom has a rational
reason to not pursue dialysis after donation, such as a
terminal illness that does not preclude kidney donation?62
Should Tom be allowed not only to donate his two
kidneys, but also to refuse RRT?
This sort of situation might be considered akin to
‘organ donation euthanasia’, whereby an individual
chooses to donate their organs as a means of euthanasia
i.e. their true aim is to die in view of their (current or
anticipated) suffering, and this is achieved by the removal
of their organs under general anaesthetic. Some argue
that this practice – which is not lawful anywhere to our
knowledge – should be endorsed, since it will increase the
pool of donor organs and in doing so tackle some of
the problems that current policies present, in terms of the
timing and definition of death in the context of dona-
tion.63 However, in our scenario, the better analogy is
with ‘thrift euthanasia’, in which ‘an intentional act of
one or more individuals. . .directly causes, or knowingly
contributes to, the death of another in a manner condu-
cive to the benefit of others’.64
We would anticipate objections – at the level of the
public interest – to allowing dual-donation if the donor
declines subsequent RRT, since this sort of ‘thrift eutha-
nasia’ might be judged to involve too great an incursion
into the value of life, and perhaps too proximate to eutha-
nasia per se. We can well expect surgeons to object to
what is being asked of them here;65 and, if a compliant
surgeon can be found, we can also expect questions being
asked of them, perhaps even by prosecutors.
But if these qualms are plausible, then so too might
they prove manageable. One could envisage a system to
ensure that principled lines are not crossed. For example,
if it is desired, dual-donation could be limited to situa-
tions in which the donor is willing to receive RRT. Dual-
donors could be subjected to screening, to ensure that
their decision is appropriately autonomous, and offered a
medical ‘alibi’ if they decide against donation.66 Equally,
donation could be restricted to ‘directed donation’ where
the recipients are known to the donor. Allowing donation
in a case like Tom’s would certainly set a precedent, but
setting such a precedent need not mean that the gates are
then flung open: for example, the aforementioned case of
Y has not heralded any significant shift from the primary
focus being on the donor.67 With individualized assess-
ments and the limitations we sketch here, the brakes
might also be applied to halt any potentially slippery
slide.
In short, dual-donation would require the combination
of an individual with normal kidney function who has a
desire to donate to two known individuals with ESRD.
Depriving the donor of the subsequent opportunity to
decline RRT might be difficult to square with respect for
autonomy, and perhaps the door should be open to
allowing this, subject to the satisfaction of certain crite-
ria. Quite what these criteria might be remains to be seen.
At the very least, it would appear appropriate to require
that donors go into the procedure prepared to become
future recipients themselves, as well as preventing a loop-
hole from opening up, through which ‘thrift euthanasia’
(and even euthanasia simpliciter) can slip through.
8. CONCLUSION
Requests for dual living kidney donation are likely to be
rare, and are most likely to be associated with familial
conditions, in which multiple members of one family
develop renal failure, while others are disease free. We
have argued that there may be a prima facie case for
allowing such donations to occur, provided that both the
donor and the recipients are willing and that due atten-
tion is paid to such considerations as the autonomy and
welfare of all parties, as well as to the wider ramifications
of acting on such a request. It may be that similar argu-
ments apply to the case of sequential donation to the
same recipient, such as was mooted in the case of Renada
Daniel-Patterson. For now, however, we have focused on
dual-donation and we have argued for broader interpre-
tations of the concepts of autonomy and welfare, which
62 Y.S. Rakké, W.C. Zuidema, M.T. Hilhorst, R.A.M. Erdman, E.K.
Massey, M.G.H. Betjes, et al. Seriously Ill Patients as Living Unspeci-
fied Kidney Donors: Rationale and Justification. Transplantation. 2015
Jan; 99(1): 232–235.
63 R. Truog, F. Miller & S. Halpern. The Dead-Donor Rule and the
Future of Organ Donation. NEngl JMed. 2013; 369(14): 1287–1289; D.
Sanghavi. When does Death Start? New York Times Magazine 2009.
16 Dec Available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/20/magazine/
20organ-t.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 [cited 2015 May 22]
64 H. Ducharme. Thrift-Euthanasia, in Theory and in Practice:
a Critique of Non-Heart Beating Organ Harvesting. In M. Freeman &
A. Lewis, editors. Law and Medicine. Current legal issues volume 3.
Oxford: Oxford University Press; 2000: 493–525.
65 R. Huxtable. Whatever You Want? Beyond the Patient in Medical
Law. Health Care Anal. 2008; 16(3): 288–301.
66 C. Thiessen, Y. Kim, R. Formica, M. Bia & S. Kulkarni. Opting Out:
Confidentiality and Availability of an ‘Alibi’ for Potential Living
Kidney Donors in the USA. J Med Ethics. 2014;Nov 3 doi:10.1136/
medethics-2014-102184 [Epub ahead of print].
67 Re op. cit. note 39.
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recognize the importance of relationships and the rel-
evance of more than merely physical well-being. We
suspect that, with such a holistic assessment, a case can be
made for allowing dual living kidney donation.
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